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Abstract 
This paper aims at providing both non-specialist and specialist readers with an overview of 
the several topics that have been addressed in the field of experimental asset markets. 
Rather than being exhaustive in any single topic, this review is meant to gather the several 
research strands and to provide a powerful picture of the main advances on the use of 
experimental techniques for the study of financial markets. 
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1. Motivational Framework 
“The social scientist who would like to study in isolation and under known conditions the 
effects of particular forces is, for the most part, obliged to his “experiment” by the 
application of general reasoning to abstract models” 
Chamberlin (1948) 
Because of the real world complexity, field data do not always manage to control for all 
the factors that are expected to be relevant when a given phenomenon is studied. As a 
consequence, validating theoretical models predictions by the use of field data might 
present some limitations. This drawback has led to an increasing body of scientific 
research focusing on the use of experimental methodologies to test theoretical models in a 
controlled environment, like a laboratory. The latter, differently from field techniques, 
allows researchers to keep under control all the variables that are supposed to be 
prominent
1
. 
Asset markets are among those fields that best suit a controlled laboratory 
environment. Indeed, variables like the fundamental value of a financial asset, the 
information conditions and the asset life period are difficult to be accounted for in real 
world markets, causing research on asset markets to be unmanageable to carry out through 
the use of field data. Differently, in a laboratory environment, researchers can exogenously 
control and observe the key parameters of the market. This latter benefit has been one of 
the main driver leading research on experimental asset markets. It is task of this article to 
present a review of this research. Each of the studies collected in this paper has to be read 
in the light of the peculiar distinctive traits of asset markets. Indeed, as pointed out by 
Sunder (1995), asset markets mainly differ from other markets for two reasons: the 
informational role of prices and the duality of the traders behaviour. Differently from good 
markets, where prices are informative up to the extent they make customers aware of their 
budget constraint, asset markets prices reflect the information available to each trader at 
any instant of time. As Plott (2000) highlights, asset markets could be compared to a 
                                                          
1 Also the external validity of the findings should be taken into account when choosing between the use of field or 
experimental approaches. 
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statistician who collects and aggregates the dispersed information and prices are the form 
in which findings are made public. The second feature refers to the fact that each trader can 
choose to be a buyer as well as a seller in the same market, depending on his or her 
expectations on future events. This diverges from classical one life period good markets, 
where re-sales are not allowed. 
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the early and leading works in 
which the foundations for later studies have been built up. Section 3 describes issues 
related with information release and market structure. Section 4 explores some stylized 
facts related with experimental asset markets. Section 5 reviews the role of market 
institutions on trading activity. Section 6 reports on the interaction between private and 
public information. Section 7 deals with the occurrence of bubbles and crashes. Section 8 
discusses the role of emotions and bounded rationality on asset markets. Finally, section 9 
concludes. 
2. Leading Works 
Forsythe et al. (1982) investigate a market where a generic asset with a risky payout is 
traded through a double auction institution
2
. Each market consists of eight repetitions 
(―years‖), each split up in two periods. The authors show that, over replications, actual 
prices converge toward the predictions supported by the rational expectations equilibrium
3
. 
Indeed, while trading is initially private information oriented in the first period, across 
replicating ―years‖, subjects learn to adjust their decisions taking into account the trading 
insights from the second period. Differently stated, the convergence process improves as 
traders learn to exploit the market opportunities in the second period and to accordingly 
update their strategies in the first period. Two years later, Forsythe et al. (1984) show that 
the convergence process toward the rational expectations equilibrium is augmented when 
future markets are introduced in the experimental design. 
Differently from Forsythe et al. (1982, 1984), some asset markets present a design 
where some agents (insiders) are fully informed on the asset fair value, while others are 
                                                          
2 This institution has the property to be symmetric and several studies showed its appropriateness in reaching the efficient 
equilibrium (Smith, 1962, 1964, 1976; Plott and Smith, 1978; Ketcham, Smith and Williams 1984; Holt, Langan and 
Villamil, 1986; Davis and Williams, 1986; Smith and Williams, 1989; Gode and Sunder, 1989, 1991; Davids, Harrison 
and Williams, 1993; Mestelman and Welland, 1992; Holt, 1995) 
3 The rational expectations model assumes that agents are able to infer all the relevant information in the market, i.e each 
subject trades as if he or she knew his or her information plus others’ information 
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not. In this setting, Plott and Sunder (1982) study the conditions under which information 
is disseminated from informed to uninformed traders. In a market where a one-period-life 
asset with a common and risky value is traded through a double auction institution, they 
show that the rational expectations model performs better than the prior information 
model
4
 in disseminating the pooled information in the market. In other words, non-
informed traders were able to infer the information held by informed traders and no 
relevant differences between informed and non-informed traders' profits were found. 
Moreover, the convergence process accelerates with subjects’ experience. 
Contrarily from the information dissemination case, some asset markets involve 
agents who are all only partially informed and none of them is given enough information to 
know the future value of the asset. This setting is usually related to information 
aggregation. In the latter framework, the price convergence process might someway 
exhibit more pitfalls than in the dissemination one. In fact, if in the dissemination case 
insiders trades release pretty univocal signals (at least when the presence of insiders is 
common knowledge), when no traders knows for sure the realized state, the beliefs leading 
other agents trades may sometimes result ambiguous and challenging to elicit. In this 
sense, whether or not markets are able to succeed in the complicated task of aggregating 
the dispersed information is still an open question. In a leading research, Plott and Sunder 
(1988) study information aggregation in three differently designed markets. In the first 
market (series A) subjects traded a three-state asset in a single period time framework. 
Traders were divided into three types and, accordingly, the asset paid out different 
dividends to each trader type. The dividend distribution was private information. Agents 
received incomplete and diverse information on the fundamental value of the asset. In the 
second market (series B) agents traded three single state assets. In particular, each asset 
paid a strictly positive return only in one contingent case. The third market (series C) was 
designed like series A markets, with the only difference that all traders belonged to the 
same class, i.e. dividends were made identical. The authors show that both series B and C 
markets converged to the rational expectations equilibrium, while series A markets did not. 
One possible explanation the authors provide for this result deals with the implicit 
information incorporated in the contingent claims design. The fact that in series B markets 
                                                          
4 Contrarily from the rational expectations model, the prior information model assumes that agents only mange to process 
their a priori information without making such an inference of others’ information. 
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the asset pays a strictly positive dividend only in one state establishes a direct line between 
the purchase or the sale of a security and the expectation on the realization of a certain 
state. Similarly, in series C markets, if traders know that others have similar preferences to 
theirs, they can correctly assess others’ trades. This feature is, on the contrary, totally 
absent in series A markets. In conclusion the authors provide the evidence that the 
knowledge of others’ preferences crucially matters for information aggregation, since 
traders can easily infer the contingent state from other subjects’ behaviour. 
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) find that the common knowledge of the dividend 
distribution and additional sessions of experience are necessary and sufficient conditions to 
have the dispersed information correctly aggregated. 
O’Brien and Srivastava (1991b) show that some further complexity in the 
experimental design - i.e. multi-period assets and the lack of common knowledge on the 
information distribution - hinders the information aggregation even when the dividend 
distribution is uniform and commonly known. 
While in the previous studies information is exogenously released, some works deal 
with markets where information does have an endogenous nature. In this sense, Sunder 
(1992) explores asset markets performance in a context where a parallel market for 
information does exist. In this new framework, agents can buy information and use it to 
trade an uncertain dividend asset. The work is mostly an experimental test on the 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) proposition. The latter states that, when information is costly 
acquired, an equilibrium level of noise trading must exist in order to allow informed 
traders to recover the cost of purchasing information by making higher earnings. Sunder 
(1992) finds that, when information supply is fixed and ―news‖ are sold to the highest 
bidders, the informational and allocative efficiency predictions of the rational expectations 
equilibrium outperform the predictions of the Walrasian hypothesis (i.e. prior information 
model). Indeed, due to a fixed information supply, the observed left demand shift declines 
the price of information to zero. Differently, when the price of information is fixed, market 
informativeness allows informed traders to recover the cost of information. 
Camerer and Weigelt (1991), investigating the huge amount of volatility that 
sometimes affects asset prices, designed a double auction market where, in each period, the 
eventual presence of informed subjects was not common knowledge. In this new 
experimental design uninformed traders do face an additional challenge. If in standard 
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contexts (see Plott and Sunder, 1982) the only concern for non-informed traders was to try 
to infer the available information, in this framework traders could not be sure about the 
presence of insiders in the market. As a consequence it might be that, even in periods with 
no insiders, some agents could mistakenly believe that there were insiders in the market. 
Then, these agents could start trading on the belief that actual prices were reflecting some 
inside information, inducing, in turn, other traders to mistakenly believe that some 
information was in the market and so on. This mechanism could lead to the creation of a 
price pattern named "information mirage". The latter occurs when traders see information 
even when no information is in the market. As a consequence, actual prices depart from the 
rational expectations equilibrium level (since they reflect some non-existent information), 
undermining the overall market efficiency. Information mirages were found to be more 
likely to occur during early periods, because during late periods traders were able to infer 
the presence of insiders by processing some non-price information like the speed of 
trading. Then, information mirages in late trading periods were more sporadic. 
Copeland and Friedman (1987) investigate a double-auction asset market where, at 
a given point during the trading period, traders receive some costless information (―news‖) 
on the uncertain current state of nature. Treatments crucially differ in the way in which 
information is released. While in the ―Sim environment‖ agents receive news 
simultaneously, in the ―Seq environment‖ information is sequentially released. 
Furthermore, the news may be the same for all (―Hom environment‖) or may be different 
among traders (―Het environment‖). The authors find that strong-form-efficiency models a 
là Fama (1970) perform better than alternatives such as the prior information model and 
the non-revelation model
5
. Moreover, the simultaneous information arrival is found to 
perform better than the sequential one. 
Copeland and Friedman (1991) extend their 1987’s study by proposing a 
reconciliation between the non-revelation and the full revelation models. Indeed, the 
authors formalize a partial revelation model where private information is only partially 
extracted from prices. 
Finally, investigating price and allocation of both the purchased information and the 
traded asset, Copeland and Friedman (1992) find that full revelation models manage to 
                                                          
5 The non-revelation model assumes that agents combine their own information with public knowledge of prices, but they 
do not manage to infer others’ private information. 
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correctly forecast the market value of information in simpler frameworks where states of 
nature are homogeneous. Differently, semi-strong efficiency models outperform in 
presence of more complex environments such as those where states of nature are 
heterogeneous. 
3. Information Release and Market Structure 
Plenty of research has been conducted to shed light on the relationship between 
market performance and market structure, with a particular focus on how information is 
released in the market. Indeed, there are some papers where information is polarized, i.e. 
some subjects are insiders and some others are uninformed (Plott and Sunder, 1982; 
Camerer and Weigelt, 1991; Brandouy et. al., 2000; Noussair and Yilong Xu, 2015); where 
subjects can buy information during the trading period (Hey and Morone, 2004; Ferri and 
Morone, 2014; Alfarano et al., 2015); where a fixed amount of partially trustable 
information is exogenously provided to all subjects before the trading period starts 
(Barreda et al., 2016a, 2016b).  
Brandouy, Barneto and Leger (2000) provide evidence about price formation, 
asymmetric information and insider trading influence. They investigate, by mean of a 
laboratory experiment, the effects of several manipulations of asymmetric information and 
communication in a double-auction stock market. They find that asymmetric information 
leads to inefficient trades when it is not revealed to market participants, causing insiders to 
make higher profits than average. On the contrary, the revelation of the presence of 
insiders significantly increases market efficiency but only in relation with bad news. Risk 
averse traders strategies may be responsible for the lower market efficiency when market 
participants are provided with good news. Communication of uncertain information 
(agents were forbidden to prove the veracity of their communications) decreases price 
efficiency, since the consequent rumour weakens insiders signals.  
Schnitzlein (2002) studied order-driven dealer markets where there is uncertainty 
about the number of insiders in the market. Schnitzlein (2002) found that insiders were 
more likely to compete aggressively when the number of insiders was common knowledge 
with respect to the treatment in which there was no disclosure. Moreover, the uncertainty 
about the actual number of insiders causes the convergence towards the fundamental value 
of the asset to be slower. So, price efficiency is higher when the number of insiders is 
8 
 
publicly known. This occurred because, in the disclosure treatment, the aggressive 
competition tended to reveal a lot of information and this allowed non-insider subjects to 
easily infer the insiders information and to accordingly adjust their behaviour. In the no 
disclosure treatment, non-informed agents do not succeed to make such an inference. 
Therefore, not only the presence of insiders but also what non-informed traders know 
about the insider presence affects market performance. 
In an extension of Benarjee (1992) and Bickchandani et al. (1992) models, Hey and 
Morone (2004) studied a (double auction) market where partially trustable information can 
be purchased at some positive cost. In this framework, on one hand, when information is 
private, socially undesirable herd behaviour may result; on the other hand private 
information may be aggregated efficiently through the price mechanism. The authors found 
that socially undesirable behaviour does result, i.e. misinformed agents acting on their 
private information mislead the market. Nevertheless, socially undesirable behaviour can 
be eliminated through the market. Moreover, greater volatility was detected when the 
reliability and the cost of information were respectively lower and higher. Both conditions 
were responsible for less information and more noise in the market. 
Huber, Kirchler and Sutter (2008) provide additional experimental evidence about 
the role of privileged information. In a framework where information is cumulatively 
distributed, the authors study whether having more information does lead to higher returns. 
While some research (Copeland and Friedman 1992, Ackert et al. 2002) shows that 
insiders profits outperform the non-informed ones when only two levels of information 
exist, the authors design an experiment where having more information than others means 
to have the same plus some extra information. This study shows that there is a wide range 
of levels of information in which having additional information does not provide benefits 
in terms of higher returns. A positive relationship between information and higher profits 
was detected only for very high levels of information.  
Hanke et al. (2010) study the economic consequences of the Tobin Tax imposition. 
The latter tax aims at fighting speculation and stabilizing foreign exchange markets. The 
experimental design consists of two double-auction markets where a foreign currency can 
be exchanged for the home currency. Each agent can be simultaneously be active in both 
the markets. Treatments differ with respect to two features: the market on and the moment 
when the tax is levied. Results show that volume is negatively affected by the tax 
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imposition, since transactions move from the taxed to the untaxed market. Market 
inefficiency does not change when both markets are taxed but significantly increases in the 
taxed market when only one market is taxed. The latter result confirms the findings of 
Bloomfield et al. (2009) and Cipriani and Guarino (2008). Finally, market volatility is not 
affected by the tax imposition. 
One year later, Kirchler et al.(2011) show that the impact of the Tobin tax on 
market volatility depends on the presence of market makers. They show that, when the 
Tobin tax is levied on one market, volatility increases if no market makers are present. On 
the contrary, when there are market makers on the unique taxed market, volatility declines. 
In the last case in which both markets are taxed, no significant effects on volatility are 
detected. 
Noussair and Yilong Xu (2015) studied the occurrence of a financial contagion and 
its relationship with information mirages in an experimental asset market. Two assets are 
traded and the value of one of them is, at some point, reduced by an exogenous shock. The 
correlation between the two assets may be known or unknown with 50% chance. In the 
former case, only half of the traders know the correlation. The setting differs from that of 
Camerer and Weigelt (1991) in the fact that the assets correlation and not the asset pay-out 
is the direct source of knowledge. Noussair and Yilong Xu (2015) show that, during 
periods when insiders were present, the private information was rapidly revealed by prices. 
However, during periods with no privileged information, information mirages occurred, 
reflecting a misleading information on the non-shocked asset value. The latter can be then 
interpreted as a form of financial contagion, implying that a market specific shock can be 
transmitted from one asset to another without a justifiable underlying reason. 
Barreda et al. (2016a) study the conditions under which information is aggregated 
in a market where heterogeneously informed traders are given the option to share their 
informative set before trading starts. The experiment runs over five treatments, which 
differ in the ex-ante distribution of the partially trustable private information. In treatment 
1 all agents received 1 piece of information; in treatment 2 base-informed (BI) agents 
received 1 piece of information and quasi-insider (QI) agents received 3 pieces of 
information; in treatment 3 all agents received 3 pieces of information; in treatment 4 base-
informed (BI) agents received 1 piece of information and quasi-insider (QI) agents 
received 9 pieces of information; in treatment 5 all agents received no information. Barreda 
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et al. (2016a) show that, when information is polarized, base-informed agents do not 
massively use the cooperation device to increase the number of their per-capita signals and 
compete against quasi-insider agents. Market efficiency is found to be significantly higher 
when quasi-insider agents are in the market with respect to the uniform information 
distribution case. The awareness that someone else is superior informed leads traders to 
focus more on what others are doing in the same market. Differently, when traders are 
uniformly informed, they do not recognize the presence of a leader in the market and, as a 
consequence, they focus more on processing their own private information. In a companion 
paper, Barreda et al. (2016b) find similar results. 
Despite the previous powerful evidence, the systematic relationship between 
information distribution among traders and market performance is still an open issue. Lux, 
Morone and Nuzzo (2016) are now providing a further contribution to address the issue. 
They design a framework where, before trading starts, subjects are exogenously assigned 
some informative signals. First, treatments differ for the ex-ante distribution of the 
information among subjects and not for the quantity of information in the market. 
Treatments also differ in the accuracy of the private information exogenously released in 
the market. This design would allow to study the role played by information and its 
distribution in promoting market efficiency. 
4. Stylized Facts 
Over the last three decades, several models - Beja and Goldman (1980), Day and Huang 
(1990), Chen et al. (2001), Farmer and Joshi (2002), LeBaron (2000), Gaunersdorfer and 
Hommes (2005), Gaunersdorfer, Hommes and Wagner (2000), Ariofovic and Gencay 
(2000), Georges (2005) - on dynamic interaction in financial markets have been developed. 
These models have shed light on some stylized facts of financial markets such as 
leptokurtic returns and autoregressive dependence in volatility. The latter evidence has led 
many researchers to reproduce the stylized facts in laboratory artificial markets, leading to 
the development of heterogeneous agents models (HAM). Outcomes of these models can 
be found in Arthur (1997), Brock and Hommes (1998), Hommes (2002), Iori (2002), Lux 
(1995, 1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000), Raberto et al. (2001). In particular, 
according to Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000) fat tails of returns distributions as well as 
volatility clustering have to be imputed to agents switching their trading strategies. When 
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the presence of chartists becomes prominent with respect to fundamentalists, extreme 
returns dominate the market and prices deviate from the asset fundamental value, inducing 
bubbles or crashes. On the opposite, in times of large price deviations from the asset fair 
value, fundamental strategies become more profitable, inducing traders to discard chart 
analysis and to focus on fundamentals. This mechanism slowly leads prices back to the 
asset fundamental value, causing a decay in the absolute returns autocorrelation function. 
In contrast with Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000), Kirchler and Huber (2007) show 
that the heterogeneity of fundamental information is the leading driver for fat tails and 
volatility clustering. More precisely, Kirchler and Huber (2007) find that decreasing 
absolute returns are positively correlated with the arrival of new fundamental information. 
Then, neither noise nor switching from chartist/fundamental strategies (as in the HAM 
framework) play a prominent role in explaining stylized facts. 
Morone (2008) compares a ―real‖ asset market with an experimental one in which 
the quantity of information is endogenously determined while the quality of information is 
exogenous. The author finds that prices volatility decreases in both the quantity and the 
quality of information. While information aggregation does occur when the quality of 
information is relatively high, the leptokurtic level of returns distribution increases in the 
cost of information. 
5. Trading Institutions 
Several studies (see Plott ,1982; Holt, 1993; Ockenfels and Roth, 2002) show that market 
institutions matter for efficiency and convergence to the market clearing outcome. Trading 
institutions commonly refer to the set of exchange rules that determines how purchase and 
sale proposals are matched and, consequently, how the price formation process evolves. 
How Cason and Friedman (1996) state, ―market institutions exist in the world in order to 
solve the incentive, coordination and logistical problems associated with price formation 
and exchange‖. 
The continuous double auction (CDA) and the single call market (SCM) have been 
the two most employed trading institutions in both theoretical and experimental works. In a 
continuous double auction mechanism, each trader, at any moment during the trading 
period, is free to enter a bid (an offer to buy one unit of the asset for a specific amount of 
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cash) or a request (an offer to sell one unit of the asset for a specific amount of cash). 
Submitted proposals appear on the book and become public information. Traders can also 
accept outstanding bids and asks, closing the transaction and making the relative price 
public information. These characteristics make the CDA the richest trading institution in 
terms of trading opportunities and within-period information. On the opposite extreme, in a 
single call market mechanism, each trader privately submits his purchase or sale order. For 
a single unit of the asset, the purchase order consists of the highest acceptable purchase 
price and the sale order represents the lowest acceptable sale price. When the trading 
period closes, the demand and supply scheme is derived and all the infra-marginal orders 
are executed at a unique price (clearing price), that is the intersection point of the demand 
and supply functions. Differently from the CDA, the SCM allows only one trading 
opportunity per period (reducing the trading strategy space) and information feedback is 
totally absent within the trading period. Among the several variants of the two main 
trading institutions, the uniform price double auction
6
 (UPDA) and the multiple call 
market
7
 (MCM) have been also widely used (see Cason and Friedman, 1996). 
As far as theoretical research is concerned, in regard to call auction modelling, the 
main contributions can be found in Mendelson (1982), Ho et al. (1985), Satterthwaite and 
Williams (1993), and Rustichini et al. (1994). About double auction modelling, the main 
contributions can be found in Friedman (1984, 1991), Wilson (1987), Easley and Ledyard 
(1993), Glosten (1994). 
In any case, not so many experimental studies have been produced on the 
relationship between trading institutions and market efficiency. 
Smith et al. (1982) compared the continuous double auction with several variants of 
the single call market institution in a stationary environment. The authors found the price 
convergence process to be more rapid in the continuous double auction. The latter 
institution also outperformed in terms of allocational efficiency except when a multiple 
unit recontracting variation of the single call market mechanism was introduced. In this 
case, the single call market showed the same allocational efficiency as the continuous 
double auction. 
                                                          
6 This trading institution preserves the huge and continuous amount of information feedback within the period while 
limiting to one the number of trading opportunities (like in the SCM). 
7 Differently from the SCM, in the MCM the market is cleared more than once within the period, increasing the number 
of trading opportunities per period. 
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In a relevant contribution, Friedman (1993a) studied the impact of both a 
continuous double auction and a call market trading mechanism (with multiple orders per 
period) on market performance. Treatments differed in the pay-out contingent states across 
traders (homogeneous v.s. heterogeneous) and in the sequential rather than simultaneous 
arrival of information. While the two employed trading institutions exhibited similar 
performance in terms of informational efficiency, the continuous double auction showed 
slightly greater allocational efficiency with respect to the call market. Market depth, meant 
as the difference
8
 between the best rejected bid and ask prices, was found to be higher 
when trading run through the call market rules. On the contrary, market volume, thought as 
the number of shares sold or bought, was higher when trading was conducted through a 
double auction mechanism. 
Cason and Friedman (1996) compares the performance of four market institutions: 
the continuous double auction (CDA), the uniform price double auction (UPDA), the 
single call market (SCM) and the multiple call market (MCM). The authors find that 
trading efficiency, expressed as the realized percentage of the maximum gains from 
exchange, is remarkably higher in CDA and MCM sessions, suggesting that multiple 
trading opportunities within a period (like those allowed in the CDA and MCM 
mechanisms) stimulate higher trading efficiency. On the opposite, the UPDA and the SCM 
institutions generate the highest informational efficiency, since they exhibit fewer 
deviations of transaction prices from the competitive equilibrium prediction levels. Then, 
the presence of multiple trading opportunities on one hand improves trading efficiency – 
inducing traders not to underreveal their true values and costs – but, on the other hand, 
generates greater mispricing with respect to the case in which only one trading opportunity 
is permitted. 
Shnitzlein (1996), in an experimental framework based on Kyle (1985), compares 
continuous and call auctions under asymmetric information. He finds that, in addition to 
not be less efficient than continuous auctions, call auctions also enhance market liquidity 
and imply less adverse selection costs for noise traders. 
Theissen (2000) compared continuous double auctions, call markets and dealer 
markets. The author focused on informational efficiency within a sequential arriving 
                                                          
8 In the double auction mechanism, the difference between the lowest ask and the highest bid is recalculated every time it 
changes and depth is computed as the time weighted average when both bids and asks are available in the sub-period. 
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information framework. He found that, in the call market institution, opening prices were 
closer to the fundamental value of the asset than opening prices in the continuous auction 
and in the dealer markets. Concurrently, the call market showed a significant tendency to 
underreact to the arrival of new information, exhibiting a poor ability to transmit the new 
information into prices. The continuous auction and the dealer markets were found to be 
more efficient at the average period price level, in the sense that, on average, these 
institutions exhibited fewer deviations from the true value of the asset. Nevertheless, the 
dealer market presented the highest transaction costs. 
Van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993) showed that the price bubbles and 
crashes typically observed in the double auction institution were also found with regularity 
in a 15-round closed-book call market treatment. Trading prices were more likely to track 
the fundamental value of the asset only when the same group of experienced traders was 
involved in three consecutive 15-round markets. 
In a market where uninformed agents cannot be sure about the presence of insiders, 
Morone and Nuzzo (2015) investigate the impact of trading institutions on both the 
occurrence of information mirages and the price discovery process. In this framework, a 
single-unit double auction institution is compared with a multiple call auction mechanism. 
The authors show that the likelihood of detecting information mirages significantly 
increases when trading is conducted through a double auction mechanism. Then, the call 
auction institution promotes a better convergence toward the efficient price when no 
insiders are in the market. Contrarily, when insiders are in the market, the double auction 
mechanism outperforms the call market one in disseminating the available information. 
According to the authors, the prominent characteristics of the double auction mechanism - 
i.e. the continuous type of trading, the absence of limits to the number of traders’ 
proposals, the public sharing of agents’ proposals as they are submitted and the continuous 
update of book orders - are, on one hand, responsible for promoting the information 
dissemination when insiders are in the market but, on the other hand, they increase the 
probability to disseminate such information that does not really exist when there are no 
insiders in the market, with the consequent augmented likelihood of detecting information 
mirages. Similarly, the main characteristics of the call market mechanism sort the opposite 
effect. 
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6. Private and Public Information 
While in the research presented so far information does have a private value, we now 
review a strand of research where public information is someway injected in the market. 
This research strand is relatively recent and it finds its main theoretical driver in Morris 
and Shin (2002). In a Keynes’ beauty contest reminiscence, the authors build up a model 
where agents access both private and public information on the underlying fundamentals. 
If on one hand subjects perform actions appropriate to the fundamentals, they also have 
incentive to coordinate one another, since the reward increases in the closeness between 
their actions and the actions of others. Morris and Shin (2002) show that a greater accuracy 
of the public signal always increases social welfare when no private information is 
accessible. On the contrary, when subjects can access private information, the greater the 
accuracy of the latter, the more detrimental an increased provision of public information 
might be in terms of social welfare. In the following years, many models –i.e. Svensson 
(2005), Colombo and Femminis (2008), Cornand and Heinemann (2008), Kool et al. 
(2011), Arato and Nakamura (2011), Chen et al. (2014) – have investigated the role of 
public information in a market context. To the best of our knowledge, experimental 
investigations on the relationship between private and public information has been carried 
out by Ferri and Morone (2008) and Alfarano et al. (2015). 
Ferri and Morone (2014) test whether the introduction of a rating agency in a 
financial market where agents are provided with partially trustable private information 
does reduce wrong herding (see Hey and Morone, 2004) and stimulate the price 
convergence toward the fundamental value of the asset. The experimental design crucially 
differs from Hey and Morone (2004) in the fact that in some treatments agents receive a 
costless public signal prior the trading start. Both private and public information are not 
totally informative of the asset fair value. Treatments differ in the precision of both private 
and public signals. Ferri and Morone (2014) show that the herding likelihood is negatively 
related with an increase in the accuracy of public information. Furthermore, the public 
signal also accelerates the price discovery process, producing a benefit in terms of market 
efficiency. 
In a similar framework, Alfarano et al. (2015) test whether investors do rely on 
public information much more than what the public signal accuracy would require. While 
in the first two treatments agents can only purchase imperfect private information, in 
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treatments from three to five subjects also receive an imperfect and costless public signal. 
Treatments differ in the combination of the precision of both private and public 
information. Alfarano et al. (2015) show that public information crowds out private 
information. In other words subjects’ demand for private information is downward shifted 
as a public signal is injected in the market. In spite of the crowding out effect, market 
informativeness does not significantly change, since the public signal introduction 
compensates the reduction in the private information demand. As far as market efficiency 
is concerned, the authors find that, in spite of the unchanged market informativeness, the 
introduction of a public signal might sort a detrimental effect. Indeed, in presence of poor 
quality private information, the public signal leads market prices. If this mechanism results 
to be beneficial for market efficiency when public information is correctly released in the 
market, undesirable and large deviations from the asset fundamentals may occur in case of 
incorrect public signal. This result is fully in line with Morris and Shin (2002). 
7. Bubbles and Crashes 
King et al. (1993) define a bubble as a ―trade in high volumes at prices that are 
considerably at variance from intrinsic values‖. The asset market property to generate 
bubbles has been first detected by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and has been 
confirmed in later works, i.e. King et al. (1993), Van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster 
(1993), Porter and Smith (1995), Fisher and Kelly (2000). In a market where a one-period-
life asset with common dividend across subjects is traded, these authors found that prices, 
instead of tracking the intrinsic asset value, exhibited phases of "boom" and "crash". At 
that time, the prominent explanation for bubbles and false equilibria was related to Smith 
et al. (1988) results, according to which bubbles arise because of the possibility to generate 
capital gains. This idea finds its main source in the hypothesis that agents rationality is not 
common knowledge. In other words, if a rational trader believes there are some irrational 
traders willing to buy at prices considerably higher than the asset fair value, he or she 
could be also willing to buy at prices higher than fundamentals because he or she expects 
to resell the asset at even higher prices to either an irrational trader or to a rational trader 
with bull market expectations. 
Lei, Noussair and Plott (2000) challenged this idea. The authors designed a market 
where any possibility of speculation was removed. In this market, subjects could be either 
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buyers or sellers, so that no one could buy with the aim to resell the asset later. Indeed, the 
asset payout was the only source of remuneration. Large price departures from the 
fundamental value at high volume were detected. Then, not the lack of common 
knowledge on others rationality but traders irrationality itself is the reason leading to 
bubbles and crashes occurrence. In the same framework, Lei, Noussair and Plott (2002) 
test the effect on bubbles and crashes of a capital gain tax of 50%. The authors find that 
bubbles still arise despite of the levied tax. The work provides a further evidence that 
bubbles are not strictly related with speculation issues. 
Ackert et al. (2002) investigate whether bubbles depend on traders’ risk attitude. 
They design an experiment where two assets are simultaneously traded in the same market. 
The two assets have equal expected value but one exhibits the characteristics of a lottery 
with large and unlikely payoff, i.e. a skewed payoff distribution. Then, in presence of 
strong risk-seeking attitude, the lottery asset should trade at levels that incorporate a 
premium, leading to larger price bubbles. The latter hypothesis is accepted but the 
willingness to pay too much for the lottery asset decreases when traders are allowed to 
make short sells and must finance themselves the purchase of the asset. 
In a similar experimental design, Ackert et al. (2006) extend the previous work by 
comparing asset prices in single and multi-period markets. While in the former speculation 
is not possible, in the latter traders can speculate across periods. The authors find that, 
when bubbles occur, single-period market asset prices are sensibly lower than 
corresponding prices in multi-period markets. Then speculation matters for bubbles 
creation. This result is in contrast with Lei, Noussair and Plott (2000, 2002). 
One leading research strand on bubbles studies the relationship between mispricing 
and traders confusion on market dynamics. In this sense, Sutter, Huber and Kirchler (2012) 
investigate whether the occurrence, as well as the intensity, of bubbles can be reduced by 
providing subjects with information about the imminent dividends. The answer is context 
dependent. Switching from a control treatment where no traders receive information on the 
future dividend to a treatment where each trader is provided with full information about the 
dividend value at the end of the period, bubbles are not significantly reduced. Surprisingly, 
in a third treatment where one third of traders knows for sure the dividends of the next two 
periods, one third of traders knows the next dividend, and one third of traders does not 
have any information on future dividends, bubbles occurrence is significantly reduced with 
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respect to both the first two treatments. The first focal point is in the fact that asymmetric 
information distributions reduce bubbles. The second point is that fundamentals tracking is 
not different switching from a situation where inexperienced traders are asymmetrically 
informed to the case where experienced traders are given no information on the future 
dividends. Then, experience does not play a major role than information distribution. 
Further research shows that confusion can be reduced when fundamental values are 
displayed in graphical form (Baghstanian and Walker, 2014), when the asset is differently 
framed (Kirchler et al., 2012) and when pre-market training about dividend payments is 
implemented (Lei and Vesely, 2009). 
Michailova and Schmidt (2011) study the relationship between bubbles and 
subjects overconfidence. After a pre-experimental overconfidence measurement, subjects 
resulted to be overconfident were assigned to the ―overconfident markets‖ and the 
remaining subjects to the ―rational markets‖. The market design resembles the one of 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). The authors show that overconfident markets trades 
were, on average, significantly higher and further from the fundamentals with respect to 
trades occurred in rational markets. Both volatility and volume trades were found to be 
lower in rational markets. The overconfidence bias was anyway decreasing as subjects got 
experience
9
. 
Cason and Samek (2015) compare the role of passive and active participation in 
mitigating bubbles occurrence. A passive trader does observe
10
 the same information and 
receive the same payout as a ―prior‖ trader, but he or she does not take decisions. In the 
experimental design, each passive trader is matched with a trader from a different ―prior‖ 
market. Cason and Samek (2015) find that passive participation reduces mispricing in 
subsequent markets, leading to conclude that prices observation can reduce bubbles. 
Passive observation learning can then be used as a confusion reducing tool. 
Cheung et al. (2014) assert that, rather than training on fundamentals, the common 
knowledge that other agents in the market are trained plays a crucial role in reducing 
mispricing. When all subjects in the market are trained with decreasing fair values but this 
                                                          
9 This result is in line with Menkhoff et al., (2006) but in contrast with Kirchler and Maciejovsky, (2002). 
10
 The observational learning properties to reduce bias in decision making has been detected in several economic games 
(Merlo and Schotter, (2003) and Kocher et al., (2015)) 
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is not commonly known, mispricing is not significantly different from the no-training case. 
Differently, when training is common knowledge, mispricing is sensibly reduced. 
Finally, some other related works focusing on the impact of fundamental value 
patterns on price bubbles have been provided by Noussair and Powell (2010) and Stöckl et 
al. (2014). Concluding, the research reviewed in this section has shown how both bubbles 
occurrence and magnitude depend on irrationality, traders cognitive abilities, risk aversion 
and fundamental value patterns. Probably, one more driving force could be identified in the 
role of emotions on mispricing. The latter topic is reviewed in the next section. 
8. Asset Markets and Emotions 
A very recent strand of research links asset market price patterns with agents’ emotions 
and mood. Some empirical data support this strand. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) detect 
a positive correlation between good weather and higher stock returns but, surprisingly, a 
switch from average to bad weather does not lower asset returns. A similar intuition is 
recalled by Kamstra et al. (2003), who note relatively low returns associated with fall and 
winter seasons. 
Only few experimental evidence on this topic are available at present time, whose 
results are not particularly divergent. These works start from the classical design a là 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and someway stimulate heterogeneous emotional 
states in market participants. Before trading starts, Lahav and Meer (2010) set up a 
treatment where positive mood was induced by showing subjects some comedy video 
clips. Market prices from this treatment were compared with the ones coming from a 
control treatment where no video clips were shown. Larger deviations from fundamentals 
were detected in the video clips treatment. 
Similarly, Andrade et al. (2012) use video clips to induce emotions before the 
market opens. A larger range of emotions is induced with respect to Lahav and Meer 
(2010). Indeed, Andrade et al. (2012) show traders videos inducing excitement, neutral 
mood, fear or sadness. A greater average bubble magnitude were produced by subjects 
undergoing the exciting video clips with respect to subjects to whom neutral, fearful or sad 
videos were shown. 
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Breaban and Noussair (2015) provide a real time emotions tracking. Through a face 
reading software, participants’ facial expressions are monitored before and while the 
market is running. Similar to the previous findings, positive emotions are positively 
correlated with overpricing and fear leads to declining price patterns. 
Kocher et al. (2015) investigate the relationship between market pricing and 
variations in self-control abilities. Two markets settings are implemented. While in one 
market agents’ self-control is not reduced (control market), in the other market, 
participants’ self-control is reduced11. In the latter treatment, significantly larger 
overpricing is detected. The paper provides evidence that self-control problems can lead to 
exuberant behaviour and mispricing. 
9. Conclusion 
This work has provided a review of the main advances on the use of experimental 
procedures to study financial market performance. The included works perform the task to 
provide readers with a picture of the prevailing research strands and the relative state of art. 
As visible, due to the advantage of making relevant variables observable, the use of a 
laboratory framework to address financial markets study has been widely adopted in the 
last decades. This makes experimental methodologies a complementary tool to both 
theoretical and empirical investigation on asset markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Exogenous self-control reduction is performed through a Stroop task. Baumeister et al. (1998) have shown the 
performance of the Stroop task in reducing people’s ability to exert self-control. 
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